



EC16

17th ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation



PROGRAMME

SUNDAY 24 JULY

CAREFUL: TIMES ACROSS COLUMNS MAY NOT ALIGN EXACTLY

09:00-10:30	EC-TUT-AGTDS: TUTORIAL ON ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY AND DATA SCIENCE (PART 1)	09:00-10:30	EC-TUT-GTSOFTWARE1: TUTORIAL ON PRACTICAL GAME THEORY COMPUTATION (PART 1)
LOCATION >	Aula Gothic	LOCATION >	A1.23
09:00	<i>Jamie Morgenstern and Vasilis Syrgkanis</i> Learning good mechanisms	09:00	<i>Theodore Turocy</i> Gambit and SageMath
11:00-12:30	EC-TUT-AGTDS: TUTORIAL ON ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY AND DATA SCIENCE (PART 2)	11:00-12:30	EC-TUT-GTSOFTWARE1: TUTORIAL ON PRACTICAL GAME THEORY COMPUTATION (PART 2)
LOCATION >	Aula Gothic	LOCATION >	A1.23
11:00	<i>Jamie Morgenstern and Vasilis Syrgkanis</i> Econometric theory	11:00	<i>Rahul Savani</i> Game Theory Explorer
		11:45	<i>Theodore Turocy</i> Algorithms
13:30-15:00	EC-AGTDS-SUN1330: WORKSHOP ON INTERFACE BETWEEN ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY AND DATA SCIENCE (PART 1)	13:30-15:35	EC-CLOUD-SUN1330: WORKSHOP ON ECONOMICS OF CLOUD COMPUTING (PART 1)
LOCATION >	Aula Gothic	LOCATION >	A1.23
13:30	<i>Dominic Coey, Bradley Larsen and Kane Sweeney</i> The Bidder Exclusion Effect	13:30	<i>Noam Nisan</i> ERA: A Framework for Economic Resource Allocation for the Cloud
14:00	<i>Jan Christoph Schlegel</i> Testing Choice Theories	14:15	<i>Ludwig Dierks and Sven Seuken</i> Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back
14:30	<i>Jason Hartline and Samuel Taggart</i> Non-revelation Mechanism Design	14:35	<i>Darrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier</i> On-Demand or Spot? Selling the Cloud to Risk-Averse Customers
		14:55	<i>Virajith Jalaparti, Ivan Bliznets, Srikanth Kandula, Brendan Lucier and Ishai Menache</i> Pretium: Dynamic Pricing and Traffic Engineering for Timely Inter-Datacenter Transfers
		15:15	<i>Felix Fischer, Ian Kash, Peter Key and Junxing Wang</i> Approximately Efficient Cost Sharing via Double Auctions
15:30-17:10	EC-AGTDS-SUN1530: WORKSHOP ON INTERFACE BETWEEN ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY AND DATA SCIENCE (PART 2)	16:05-17:30	EC-CLOUD-SUN1330: WORKSHOP ON ECONOMICS OF CLOUD COMPUTING (PART 2)
LOCATION >	Aula Gothic	LOCATION >	A1.23
15:30	<i>Denis Nekipelov</i> Inference and Auction Design in Online Advertising		
16:20	<i>Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Jan Vondrak</i> When are Welfare Guarantees Robust?	16:05	<i>Matthias Feldotto, Lennart Leder and Alexander Skopalik</i> Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives
16:30	<i>Pingzhong Tang and Yulong Zeng</i> How to Manipulate Truthful Prior Dependent Mechanisms	16:25	<i>John Conley</i> Dynamic Games for Market Dominance in the Cloud
16:40	<i>Harikrishna Narasimhan and David C. Parkes</i> A General Statistical Framework for Designing Strategy-proof Assignment Mechanisms	16:45	<i>Simon Wilkie</i> The Price of Privacy in the Cloud, or The Economic Consequences of Mr. Snowden
16:50	<i>Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer and Peter Stone</i> Robust Automated Mechanism Design		
17:00	<i>Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer and Giuseppe Lopomo</i> Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility		

MONDAY 25 JULY

CAREFUL: TIMES ACROSS COLUMNS MAY NOT ALIGN EXACTLY

08:30-10:30	EC-AGTDS-MON830: WORKSHOP ON INTERFACE BETWEEN ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY AND DATA SCIENCE (PART 3)	09:00-10:30	EC-TUT-ELICML1: TUTORIAL ON ELICITATION AND MACHINE LEARNING (PART 1)
LOCATION >	Aula Gothic	LOCATION >	A1.23
08:30	<i>Yongdong Liu, Denis Nekipelov and Minjung Park</i> Competition and Efficiency in Large Markets for Innovation: The Case of Mobile Applications on iTunes and Google Play	09:00	<i>Rafael Frongillo and Bo Waggoner</i> Foundations of elicitation
09:00	<i>Noam Nisan and Gali Noti</i> An Experimental Evaluation of Regret-Based Econometrics		
09:30	<i>Matthew Joseph, Michael Kearns, Jamie Morgenstern and Aaron Roth</i> Fairness in Learning: Classic and Contextual Bandits		
10:00	<i>Xi Alice Gao, James R. Wright and Kevin Leyton-Brown</i> Incentivizing Evaluation via Limited Access to Ground Truth: Peer-Prediction Makes Things Worse		
11:00-12:30	SURPRISE ACT AND NOBEL SESSION		
LOCATION >	Vrijthof Theater		
14:00-15:30	EC-ADAUC-MON14: WORKSHOP ON AD AUCTIONS (PART 1)	13:00-14:50	EC-TUT-ELICML2: TUTORIAL ON ELICITATION AND MACHINE LEARNING (PART 2)
LOCATION >	Aula Gothic	LOCATION >	A1.23
		13:00	<i>Rafael Frongillo and Bo Waggoner</i> Connections to machine learning
14:00	<i>Various Speakers</i> Mini-talks		
14:30	<i>Patrick De Pas</i> Criteo Bidding Strategy		
16:00-17:30	EC-ADAUC-MON16: WORKSHOP ON AD AUCTIONS (PART 2)	15:00-17:30	EC-TUT-POKER: TUTORIAL ON COMPUTER POKER
LOCATION >	Aula Gothic	LOCATION >	A1.22
		15:00	<i>Sam Ganzfried and Marc Lanctot</i> (organizers)
16:00	<i>Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Lemes, Pingzhong Tang and Song Zuo</i> Optimal Dynamic Mechanisms with Ex-Post IR via Bank Accounts		<i>Sébastien Lahaie and Miroslav Dudik</i> (organizers)
16:22	<i>Dylan Foster, Zhiyuan Li, Thodoris Lykouris, Karthik Sridharan and Éva Tardos</i> Fast Convergence of Common Learning Algorithms in Games		
16:45	<i>Dominic Coey and Seungwon Jeong</i> Incentive Compatibility of VCG under Miscalibration		
17:08	<i>Mark Hou, Eric Sodomka and Nicolas Stier-Moses</i> Game Abstractions for Counterfactual Predictions in Online Markets		
18:00-20:00	EC-MON18: RECEPTION AND POSTERS (EC ONLY)		
LOCATION >	Vrijthof Museum / Grand Café Maastricht Soiron		

TUESDAY 26 JULY

09:00-10:30	EC-1A: AUCTION THEORY	09:00-10:30	EC-1B: MATCHING
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A	LOCATION >	Aula Gothic A
09:00	<i>Tim Roughgarden and Okke Schrijvers</i> Ironing in the Dark	09:00	<i>John Dickerson, David Manlove, Benjamin Plaut, Tuomas Sandholm and James Trimble</i> Position-Indexed Formulations for Kidney Exchange
09:22	<i>Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline and Denis Nekipelov</i> A/B Testing of Auctions	09:22	<i>Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna and Yang Li</i> The Stochastic Matching Problem with (Very) Few Queries
09:45	<i>Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna Karlin and Elias Koutsoupas</i> The FedEx Problem	09:45	<i>Ravi Jagadeesan</i> Cadet-Branch Matching in a Quasi-Linear Labor Market
10:08	<i>Robert Kleinberg, Bo Waggoner and Glen Weyl</i> Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search	10:08	<i>Jan Christoph Schlegel</i> Virtual Demand and Stable Mechanisms
11:00-12:30	EC-BEST: BEST PAPER AND BEST DISSERTATION AWARD PRESENTATIONS		
LOCATION >	Greek Aula A		
11:00	<i>Piotr Dworzak</i> Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains		
11:30	<i>Kobi Gal, Moshe Mash, Ariel Procaccia and Yair Zick</i> Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?		
12:00	<i>Inbal Talgam-Cohen</i> SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award presentation		
14:00-15:30	EC-2A: MECHANISM DESIGN AND AUCTION THEORY	14:00-15:30	EC-2B: INFORMATION ELICITATION
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A	LOCATION >	Aula Gothic A
14:00	<i>Andrew Kephart and Vincent Conitzer</i> The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Reporting Costs	14:00	<i>Amir Ban, Yishay Mansour and Yossi Azar</i> When Should an Expert Make a Prediction?
14:22	<i>Zihe Wang and Pingzhong Tang</i> Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated Items	14:22	<i>Rachel Cummings, David Pennock and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan</i> The Possibilities and Limitations of Private Prediction Markets
14:45	<i>Kyle Woodward</i> Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions: Equilibrium Existence with Private Information	14:45	<i>Christian Kroer, Miroslav Dudik, Sébastien Lahaie and Sivaraman Balakrishnan</i> Arbitrage-Free Combinatorial Market Making via Integer Programming
15:08	<i>Marek Pycia and Kyle Woodward</i> Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible Goods	15:08	<i>Victor Shnayder, Arpit Agarwal, Rafael Frongillo and David Parkes</i> Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer Prediction
15:50-17:40	EC-3A: MECHANISM DESIGN AND AUCTION THEORY	15:50-17:40	EC-3B: COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A	LOCATION >	Aula Gothic A
15:50	<i>Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, and Xiaoqian (Michael) Zhang</i> Optimal Commitments in Asymmetric Auctions with Incomplete Information	15:50	<i>Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Iddan Golmb</i> On Voting and Facility Location
16:12	<i>Itai Ashlagi, Costis Daskalakis and Nima Haghpanah</i> Sequential Mechanisms with Ex-post Participation Guarantees	16:12	<i>Ashish Goel and Lee David</i> Towards Large-Scale Deliberative Decision-Making: Small Groups and the Importance of Triads
16:34	<i>Ian Kash and Rafael Frongillo</i> Optimal Auctions with Restricted Allocations	16:34	<i>Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin, Ariel Procaccia, Nisarg Shah and Junxing Wang</i> The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
16:56	<i>Costis Daskalakis, Christos Papadimitriou and Christos Tzamos</i> Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?	16:56	<i>Ioannis Caragiannis, George Krimpas and Alexandros Voudouris</i> How Effective Can Simple Ordinal Peer Grading Be?
17:18	<i>Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern and Guy Reiner</i> Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements	17:18	<i>Antoine Desir, Vineet Goyal and Danny Segev</i> Assortment Optimization under a Random Swap based Distribution over Permutations Model
18:00-19:00	GAMES: VON NEUMANN LECTURE <i>Sylvain Sorin</i> Asymptotic Value of Dynamic Games		
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A		
19:30-22:30	CONFERENCE DINNER		
LOCATION >	"D'n Awwe Stiene" Church B		

WEDNESDAY 27 JULY


09:00-10:30	EC-4A: MODELS OF BEHAVIOR AND INTERNET APPLICATIONS	09:00-10:30	EC-4B: MARKET ALGORITHMS
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A	LOCATION >	Aula Gothic A
09:00	<i>Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren and Manish Raghavan</i> Planning Problems for Sophisticated Agents with Present Bias	09:00	<i>Vincent Cohen Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman and Amos Fiat</i> The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing
09:22	<i>Nick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier and Emmanouil Pountourakis</i> Procrastination with Variable Present Bias	09:22	<i>Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Stefano Leonardi</i> Lottery Pricing Equilibria
09:45	<i>Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian and Mohamed Mostagir</i> A Dynamic Model of Crowdfunding	09:45	<i>Nathaniel Kell and Debmalaya Panigrahi</i> Online Budgeted Allocation with General Budgets
10:12	<i>Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupas, Maria Kyropoulou and Yiannis Tselekounis</i> Blockchain Mining Games	10:12	<i>Wang Yajun and Sam Chiu-wai Wong</i> Matroid Online Bipartite Matching and Vertex Cover
11:00-12:30	EC PLENARY SESSION AND KALAI PRIZE		
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A		
11:00	EC PLENARY TALK <i>Keith Chen</i> Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surge Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber Platform		
11:45	KALAI PRIZE TALK <i>Tim Roughgarden</i> Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy		
12:30-14:00	EC BUSINESS MEETING (ALL ARE WELCOME)		
LOCATION >	Aula Gothic A		
14:00-15:30	EC-5A: COMPUTATIONAL GAME THEORY	14:00-15:30	EC-5B: ONLINE BEHAVIOR AND SYSTEMS
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A	LOCATION >	Aula Gothic A
14:00	<i>Christian Kroer and Tuomas Sandholm</i> Imperfect-Recall Abstractions with Bounds in Games	14:00	<i>Quinn Ye, Saarthalik Malik, Ji Chen and Haijun Zhu</i> The Seasonality Of Paid Search Effectiveness From A Long Running Field Test
14:22	<i>Yannai Gonczarowski and Moshe Tennenholtz</i> A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection Games	14:22	<i>Thomas Blake, Chris Nosko and Steven Tadelis</i> Returns to Consumer Search: Evidence from eBay
14:45	<i>Umang Bhasarkar, Yu Cheng, Young Kun Ko and Chaitanya Swamy</i> Hardness Results for Signaling in Bayesian Zero-Sum and Network Routing Games	14:45	<i>Ziv Epstein, Alexander Peysakhovich and David Rand</i> The Good, the Bad, and the Unflinchingly Selfish: Cooperative Decision-Making can be Predicted with high Accuracy when using only Three Behavioral Types
15:08	<i>Xu Haifeng</i> The Mysteries of Security Games	15:08	<i>Ceren Budak, Sharad Goel, Justin Rao and Georgios Zervas</i> Understanding Emerging Threats to Online Advertising
16:00-17:00	GAMES: MORGENSTERN LECTURE <i>Thomas Palfrey</i> Trading Votes for Votes - A Decentralized Matching Algorithm		
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A		
17:20 - 18.50	EC-6A: REVENUE OPTIMIZATION AND PRICING	17:20 - 18.50	EC-6B: SOCIAL NETWORKS
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A	LOCATION >	Aula Gothic A
17:20	<i>Shuchi Chawla and Benjamin Miller</i> Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation	17:20	<i>Jie Gao, Golnaz Ghasemiefteh, Grant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu</i> General Threshold Model for Social Cascades: Analysis and Simulations
17:42	<i>Hamid Nazerzadeh, Renato Paes Leme, Afshin Rostamizadeh and Umar Syed</i> Where to Sell: Simulating Auctions From Learning Algorithms	17:42	<i>Mehrdad Moharrami, Vijay Subramanian, Mingyan Liu and Marc Lelarge</i> Impact of Community Structure on Cascades
18:05	<i>Agrawal Shipra, Vashist Avadhanula, Vineet Goyal and Assaf Zeevi</i> A Near-Optimal Exploration-Exploitation Approach for Assortment Selection	18:05	<i>Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren and Moshe Tennenholtz</i> Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
18:28	<i>Tim Roughgarden and Joshua Wang</i> Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves	18:28	<i>Marcin Dziubinski, Sanjeev Goyal and David Minarsch</i> Dynamic Conflict on A Network
19:00-01:00	BRIGHTLANDS PARTY - SCIENCE, FOOD, DRINKS AND CULTURE		
LOCATION >	Muziekjeterij C		

THURSDAY 27 JULY


09:00-10:30	EC-7A: PRICING, PRIVACY AND ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION	09:00-10:30	EC-7B: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall (A)	LOCATION >	Aula Gothic (A)
09:00	Maxime Cohen, Georgia Perakis and Robert Pindyck Pricing with Limited Knowledge of Demand	09:00	Joseph Halpern, Rafael Pass and Lior Seeman Computational Extensive-Form Games
09:22	Rachel Cummings, Katrina Ligett, Mallesh Pai and Aaron Roth The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models	09:22	Xiaohui Bei, Jugal Garg and Martin Hoefer Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown Markets
09:45	Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Zhiwei Steven Wu Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games	09:45	Ozan Candogan, Markos Epitropou and Rakesh Vohra Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach
10:08	Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe and Ruixin Qiang Persuasion with Limited Communication	10:08	Ioannis Panageas and Georgios Piliouras Average Case Performance of Replicator Dynamics in Potential Games via Computing Regions of Attraction
11:00-12:30	EC-8A: TRUST, RECOMMENDATION AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS	11:00-12:30	EC-8B: MARKET DESIGN
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall (A)	LOCATION >	Aula Gothic (A)
11:00	Frank Cheng, Junming Liu, Kareem Amin and Michael Wellman Strategic Payment Routing in Financial Credit Networks	11:00	Thayer Morrill Petty Envy When Assigning Objects
11:22	Grant Schoenebeck, Aaron Snook and Fang-Yi Yu Sybil Detection Using Latent Network Structure	11:22	Avinatan Hassidim, Romm Assaf and Ran I. Shorrer "Strategic" Behavior in a Strategy-proof Environment
11:45	Gal Bahar, Mashe Tennenholtz and Rann Smorodinsky Economic Recommendation Systems	11:45	Maximilien Burq, Itai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets
12:08	Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken and Stefano Battiston Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps	12:08	Itai Ashlagi and Afshin Nikzad What Matters in School Choice Tie-breakings? How Competition Guides Design
13:30 - 14:40	EC-9A: MECHANISM DESIGN	13:30 - 14:40	EC-9B: EFFICIENCY AND PRICING
LOCATION >	Concert Hall (B)	LOCATION >	Aula Gothic (A)
13:30	Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms	13:30	Richard Cole and Yixin Tao Large Market Games with Near Optimal Efficiency
13:52	Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos and Manolis Zampetakis Mechanism Design with Selective Verification	13:52	Jacob Abernethy, Sébastien Lahaie and Matus Telgarsky Rate of Price Discovery in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
14:15	Joosung Lee Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms	14:15	Yiwei Chen and Vivek Farias On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic Customers
15:00-16:10	EC-10A: DYNAMIC MECHANISM DESIGN AND POSITION AUCTIONS	15:00-16:10	EC-10B: RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND PREFERENCE REVELATION
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall (A)	LOCATION >	Aula Gothic (A)
15:00	Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer and David Parkes Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions	15:00	Mohammad Hossein Bateni, Yiwei Chen, Dragos Ciocan and Vahab Mirrokni Fair Resource Allocation in A Volatile Marketplace
15:22	Santiago Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment	15:22	Nathan Kallus and Madeleine Udell Revealed Preference at Scale: Learning Personalized Preferences from Assortment Choices
15:45	Maxime Cohen, Ilan Lobel and Renato Paes Leme Feature-based Dynamic Pricing	15:45	Vittorio Bilò and Cosimo Vinci Dynamic Taxes for Polynomial Congestion Games
16:15-17:00	EC-TESTOFTIME Craig Tovey and Michael Trick SIGecom Test of Time Award Presentation J. Bartholdi and J. Orlin, Single Transferable Vote resists strategic voting. Social Choice and Welfare 8:341-354, 1991. J. Bartholdi, C. Tovey, M. Trick, How hard is it to control an election?, Mathematical and Computer Modelling 16 (8-9), 27-40, 1992.		
LOCATION >	Lecture Hall (A)		
17:00-19:00	FAREWELL BBO (EC ONLY)		
LOCATION >	Mensa (A)		

FLOORPLANS

TS53 SECOND FLOOR



TS53 FIRST FLOOR



TS53 GROUND FLOOR

