GAMES 2016
5th World Congress of the Game Theory Society

24-28 JULY 2016
MAASTRICHT

CONGRESS
PROGRAMME
5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // SUNDAY 24 JULY 2016

09:00-10:30 PARALLEL SESSIONS A-B

LOCATION: C-1.03

09:00
Tomasz Sadzik and Pavel Andryushenkov
Position auctions with endogenous sample
YoungHeun In
YoungHeun In
Jump bidding in PCC
YoungHeun In

10:00
Saeed Alaei, Georgios Petropoulos
C-1.03
Sergei Izmalkov, Tomasz Sadzik and A:

11:00
Georgios Petropoulos
Optimal Selling Mechanisms for On-line Services I
Jeanette Brosa, Koch and Timo Heinrich
Social Distance in Buyer-Determined Procurement

12:00
Mina Haghiyahdon and Jason Hartline
Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination

14:00-15:30 SEMI-PLENARY SESSIONS I

LOCATION: Lecture Hall

14:00
Chris Shannon
Matching and Markets

14:45
David Levine
 Voting versus Lobbying

15:40-17:10 PARALLEL SESSIONS C-D

LOCATION: C-1.09

15:40
YoungHeun In

LOCATION: C-1.04

15:40
Saeed Alaei, Jason Hartline, Roald Nizaldah, Emmanuel Pournaras and Yong T. Jin
Anonymous Auctions vs. Simple Pricings

16:40
Takafumi Otokawa, Amy Greenwell and Vasilis Papadopoulos
Optimal Auctions with Convex-Priced Payments

17:00
Shuichi Ota, Hu Fu and Anna Karin
Simple, Approximately Optimal Auctions for Interdependent Value Settings

18:00-19:30 WELCOME AND PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

LOCATION: Vrijthof theatre
**Session Overview**

**Sun 11**

10:30 - 10:40
- **Opening Remarks**

10:40 - 10:50
- **Welcome Remarks**

10:50 - 11:00
- **Keynote Talk**

11:00 - 11:30
- **Talk 1**

11:30 - 11:40
- **Panel Discussion**

11:40 - 11:50
- **Break Time**

11:50 - 12:20
- **Talk 2**

12:20 - 12:50
- **Talk 3**

12:50 - 13:00
- **Discussion**

13:00 - 15:00
- Lunch Break

15:00 - 16:00
- **Talk 4**

16:00 - 16:10
- **Closing Remarks**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SESSION</th>
<th>SPEAKERS</th>
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<tr>
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<td>PARALLEL SESSIONS A/B/C/D/E/F/G/H/I/J/K/L/M/N/O/P/Q/R/S/T/U/V/W/X/Y/Z</td>
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<tr>
<td>09:00</td>
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<td>Andrew McLellan: Knowing Your Opponent - Asymmetries and Auction Design</td>
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<td>Nine Bokkova: First Price Auction with asymmetrically Budget Constrained Bidders</td>
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<td>Carolina Manzano and Xavier Vives: Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetrically Divisible Good Auctions</td>
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<td>11:00-12:30</td>
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<td>09:10-11:00: Robert Aumann: Why Consciousness? Roger Myerson: Multiple Equilibria Eric Maskin: Improving U.S. Presidential Elections</td>
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<td>14:00-15:30</td>
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<td>Lecture Hall: Paul Klemperer: &quot;Demand types&quot;, Equilibrium, and Auctions</td>
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<td>15:45-17:15</td>
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<td>Michael Maschek: Information Resale in Networks</td>
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<td>16:00-17:30</td>
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<td>Lecture Hall: Alex McKeon: Monotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets</td>
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<td>Lecture Hall: Markus Wetzl: Competing Trade Mechanisms and Monotone Mechanism Choice</td>
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<td>17:00-18:30</td>
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<td>Lecture Hall: Juan Carlos Carbojés and Rudolf Müller: Monotonicity and Revenue Equivalence Domains by Monotone Transformations in Differences</td>
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<td>18:00-19:00</td>
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<td>Lecture Hall: Pim Heijnen, Marco Predia, Vitali Gretschko, and Haio Moss: Robust Bidding</td>
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### 5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

#### CONGRESS PROGRAMME // MONDAY 25 JULY 2016

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11:00-12:10 SEMINAR SESSIONS II

LOCATION: Lecture Hall  0  Concert Hall  0  Aula Gothic  0

11:00
Chistos Papadimitriou
The Unreasonably Productive Interaction of the Theories of Games and Computation

11:45
Rahul Vohra
Shaf's Lemma and Stable Matchings

16:00-17:30 POSTER SESSION

LOCATION: Lounge SBE  0

18:00-19:00 VON NEUMANN LECTURE

LOCATION: Lecture Hall  0  Sylvain Sorin  Asymptotic Value of Dynamic Games
### K: PUBLIC GOOD

#### L: CONTESTS
- Peter Bayer: Sophisticatedly Stable Equilibria in the Local Public Goods Game
  - Marco Serena: Hamesing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts
  - Tomasz Mylokanov: The sender-payoff approach to signaling the informed-principal problem
  - Norma Olszewski and Federico Valenciano: A marginalist model of network formation
  - Claudia Cunín: Doing it when others do: a strategic model of procrastination
  - Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg, Teni Kinelred, and William R. Kerr: Cognition and Rationality
  - Erez Hasnani, Peter Klibanoff, and Soojin Mukey: Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players
  - María Gómez-Rúa and Heinrich Neumann: Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation
  - M. Jozef Alizadeh and J. Carlos Santos: Claims-separability consistency and potential for claims problems

#### M: COMMUNICATION
- Anna Stoppanno and Edward Cartwright: Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
  - Ido Bitot and Alberto Vesperoni: A context-success function for networks
  - Jian Chen, Maria Goltzman, Johannes Horner, and Gregory Pavlov: Multi-stage immediate communication in a sender-receiver model
  - Arsalin Halidzic and Enrico Minci: Gratification and flourishing: well-being in interaction
  - Bernardo Garcia-Polo, Noyare Kibert, and James Kavanagh: Non-Equilibrium Play in Centipede Games
  - Fanni Boboki and Zsolt Udvari: Games in partition function form with restricted cooperation
  - Ido Bitot and Hans Peters: Information aggregation with multiple issues and continuum of types
  - Florian Nenova: Weak necessary players, Myerson fairness and the concept of equality
  - Markus Kinander, Hubert Kiss, and Agnes Fazekas: Would Depositors pay to show that they do not withdraw? Theory and Experiment

#### N: NETWORKS
- Anna Van Den Nouweland and Myrna Woolders: Existence of Share Equilibria in Symmetric Local Public Good Economies
  - Francesco Diem: Slightly Biased Communication
  - Rui Gong, Jiexiang He and Frank Page: Incentive Compatible Networks and the Delegated Networking Principle
  - Romain Girault: Lionel Page and John Wooders: Win-Win Revisited
  - Hakan Inci: Existence of a Unique Core Partition in Coalition Formation Games
  - Min-Xue Xue: Efficiency and fairness in claims problems under uncertainty
  - Olga Gনeiewski and Alia Gizatulina: Selling Money on Ellay: A Field Test for Social Preferences

#### P: PSYCHOLOGY
- Peter Bayer: Sophisticatedly Stable Equilibria in the Local Public Goods Game
  - Anna Stoppanno and Edward Cartwright: Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
  - Anna Van Den Nouweland and Myrna Woolders: Existence of Share Equilibria in Symmetric Local Public Good Economies
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#### Q: DEPTH OF REASONING
- Anna Stoppanno and Edward Cartwright: Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
  - Anna Van Den Nouweland and Myrna Woolders: Existence of Share Equilibria in Symmetric Local Public Good Economies
  - Francesco Diem: Slightly Biased Communication
  - Rui Gong, Jiexiang He and Frank Page: Incentive Compatible Networks and the Delegated Networking Principle
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#### R: COOPERATIVE
- Anna Stoppanno and Edward Cartwright: Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
  - Anna Van Den Nouweland and Myrna Woolders: Existence of Share Equilibria in Symmetric Local Public Good Economies
  - Francesco Diem: Slightly Biased Communication
  - Rui Gong, Jiexiang He and Frank Page: Incentive Compatible Networks and the Delegated Networking Principle
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#### S: VOTING
- Anna Stoppanno and Edward Cartwright: Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
  - Anna Van Den Nouweland and Myrna Woolders: Existence of Share Equilibria in Symmetric Local Public Good Economies
  - Francesco Diem: Slightly Biased Communication
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#### T: FAIRNESS
- Anna Stoppanno and Edward Cartwright: Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
  - Anna Van Den Nouweland and Myrna Woolders: Existence of Share Equilibria in Symmetric Local Public Good Economies
  - Francesco Diem: Slightly Biased Communication
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#### U: EXPERIMENTS - MONEY
- Anna Stoppanno and Edward Cartwright: Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
  - Anna Van Den Nouweland and Myrna Woolders: Existence of Share Equilibria in Symmetric Local Public Good Economies
  - Francesco Diem: Slightly Biased Communication
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  - Romain Girault: Lionel Page and John Wooders: Win-Win Revisited
  - Hakan Inci: Existence of a Unique Core Partition in Coalition Formation Games
  - Min-Xue Xue: Efficiency and fairness in claims problems under uncertainty
  - Olga Gনeiewski and Alia Gizatulina: Selling Money on Ellay: A Field Test for Social Preferences
**5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY**

**CONGRESS PROGRAMME // WEDNESDAY 27 JULY 2016**

**09:00-10:30 PARALLEL SESSIONS WED09**

**A: AUCTIONS - DESIGN**

- **C-1.03**
  - Moshe Babaioff, Yannick A. Goncalves and Noam Nisan
  - The Menu-Size Complexity of Revenue Approximation

**B: IO MONOPOLY**

- **C-1.05**
  - Daniele Conordi and Roberto Serroni
  - Buyer-Optimal Demand and Monopoly Pricing

**C: IO**

- **C-1.09**
  - Tatuya Kitagawa, Yasuhisa Masuda and Masahiro Mizumasa
  - Optimal Two-part Tariff Licensing for Incumbent Innovator in Differentiated Product Markets

**D: AGENCY - MODELS**

- **C-1.07**
  - Martin Poltrock
  - Mediated Audits

**E: BANKRUPTCY**

- **G0.03**
  - Antonio Estevez Fernandez, Peter Borm and M. Gloria Fastas-Janeiro
  - Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games

**F: SCHOOL CHOICE**

- **G1.09 (1)**
  - Ioana Pivovar and Marc Vorsatz
  - Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment

**G: SOLUTION CONCEPTS**

- **A1.23**
  - Bram Draiean
  - Truncated Leximin Solutions

**H: IMPLEMENTATION**

- **D0.03**
  - Masaki Yoshihara and Michele Lombardi
  - Partially-honest Nash Implementation with non-connected honesty standards

**I: EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS**

- **H0.04**
  - Noemí Góská, Rodica Ioana Lung and Mihai Scaii
  - Approximation of Generalized Nash Equilibria by Means of Evolutionary Computation

**09:30**

**DEBASIS MISHRA and TRISH SHAHMA**

Balanced Ranking Mechanisms

- **C-1.03**
  - Robert Seogryi
  - Monopoly Pricing with Dual Capacity Constraints

**10:00**

**CERDIL SETYU**

Auctions vs. Fixed Pricing: Competing for Budget Constrained Buyers

- **C-1.05**
  - Filiberto Balestreri, Sergei Izhakov and Ivan Levi
  - The Market for Surprises: Selling Substitute Goods through Lotteries

**10:45**

**10:45-12:00 SEMI-PLENARY SESSIONS IV**

**SPD-EC PLENARY / KALAI PRIZE**

- **SP1: GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY**
  - **SP2: ORGAN EXCHANGE / INFORMATION ACQUISITION**
  - **SP3: LAW**

**11:00**

**LOCATION**

- **Lecture Hall**
  - Concert Hall
  - Greek Aula
  - Aula Gothic

**11:00**

**KAILE CHEN**

Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surf Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber Platform

- **Lecture Hall**
  - Colin Camerer
  - Neural circuitry of strategic thinking

**11:45**

**TIM ROUGHGARDEN**

Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy in Stochastic Game theory and evolution

- **Lecture Hall**
  - Hulya Eraslan
  - Information Acquisition under Persuasive Precedent versus Binding Precedent

**14:00-15:30 PARALLEL SESSIONS WED14**

**A: AUCTIONS - COMBINATORIAL**

- **C-1.03**
  - Giacomo Marzi and Pier Paolo Battistin
  - Equilibrium Bidding Strategies in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions with Discomonies of Scale

**B: IO TRADE**

- **C-1.05**
  - Giacomo Marzi and Pier Paolo Battistin
  - Equilibrium Bidding Strategies in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions with Discomonies of Scale

**C: IO LEARNING**

- **C-1.09**
  - Avinash Abhyankar and Richard Zeckhauser
  - Learning Heuristics

**D: DEPTH OF DEBATE**

- **C-1.07**
  - Mykola Melnychuk
  - A regret-optimal approach to static games

**E: PRIVACY**

- **G0.03**
  - Benjamin Edelman
  - Privacy in the Marketplace for Stochastic Objects

**F: SCHOOL CHOICE**

- **G1.09**
  - Ioana Pivovar and Marc Vorsatz
  - Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment

**G: SOLUTION CONCEPTS**

- **A1.23**
  - Bram Draiean
  - Truncated Leximin Solutions

**H: IMPLEMENTATION**

- **A1.23**
  - Ayse M. Derya
  - Legal Ontology

**I: EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS**

- **A1.23**
  - Ayse M. Derya
  - Evolutionary Dynamics of Stochastic evolutionary games

**16:00-17:00 MORGENSTERN LECTURE**

- **Lecture Hall**
  - Thomas Palfrey
  - Trading Votes for Votes - A Decentralized Matching Algorithm

**17:15-18:15**

**ELSEVIER PUBLISHING CONNECT AUTHOR WORKSHOP**

**LOCATION**

- **Lecture Hall**
  - Elsevier Publishing Connect Author Workshop
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<tr>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>Takahiro Saga Effects of Seller’s Information Disclosure in Equity Auctions Requiring Post-Auction Investment</td>
<td>Agnieszka Wlazniaksa- Matysiak, Marek Bodnar and fryderyk Miotko Dynamic oligopoly with sticky prices - off-steady-state analysis</td>
<td>Alexey Tetenov An Economic Theory of Statistical Testing</td>
<td>Emiliana Cataniai and Sergey Stepanov Reputation Concerns and Information Aggregation</td>
<td>Francisco Robles, Jimezinez and Marina Nunez Core and competitive equilibrium in one-seller assignment markets with multi-firm analysis</td>
<td>Julien Come, Olivier Terence and Camile Tiberi The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence</td>
<td>Rida Lokaci Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Existence of Maximal Elements and Coalitional Equilibria under Discontinuous Preferences</td>
<td>William Sandholm and Mathias Staudigl Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability</td>
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<td>11:00</td>
<td>Francisco Robles An Implementation of the Vickrey outcome for buyers-submodular one-seller markets</td>
<td>Tomoya Tjtopki Concealments of Problem: An Incentive of Avoiding the Responsibility</td>
<td>Ayca Ozeoglu Occurrence of deception in the presence of a regulator with reputation concerns</td>
<td>Ato Atay and Marina Nunez Multi-sided assignment games on m-partite graphs</td>
<td>William Zwicker and Josep Freixas Scale-invariant citation indices</td>
<td>Sonal Yadav, Anurava Sen, Sovadi Roy and Hassia Zeng Adjacent non-manipulability and strategy-proofness in voting domains: equivalence results,</td>
<td>Nupur Adachi Strategy-proofness and double implementation with minimax and maximin strategies</td>
<td>Akira Ohsaka and Ryosuke Saw A evolutionary approach to social choice problems with q quota rules</td>
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<td>11:30</td>
<td>Alexander Hecalio Partnership Disclosures and Differences between Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept</td>
<td>Lisa Planer-Friedrich and Marco Sahm Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
<td>Umberto Grandi and Paolo Turin A network-based rating system and its resistance to bribery</td>
<td>Johannes Hahbauer and Dominik Hofstetter A network-based rating system and its resistance to bribery.</td>
<td>Karol Szwagrak and Rafael Trabesich Co-authorship and the Measurement of Individual Productivity</td>
<td>Mateusz Mihalak, Paula Penna and Peter Widmayer Bribe-proof mechanisms for two-values domains</td>
<td>Peter Eccles and Noreen Wigger Robustness of Subgame Perfect Implementation</td>
<td>Mattia Steinbecher and Matja Steinbecher Opinion Formation with Imperfect Agents as an Evolutionary Process</td>
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<td>SHAPLEY LECTURE</td>
<td>Bruno Zikotto Limit Value in Stochastic Games</td>
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<td>Christoph Wolf, Informative Milestones in Experimentation</td>
<td>Alexander Heczko, Francisco Robles</td>
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