



GAMES

2016

5th World Congress of the Game Theory Society



24-28 JULY 2016
MAASTRICHT

CONGRESS
PROGRAMME

GAME THEORY
SOCIETY



Maastricht University



CONGRESS PROGRAMME // SUNDAY 24 JULY 2016

09:00-10:30	PARALLEL SESSIONS SUN9	A: AUCTIONS - DESIGN	B: AUCTIONS - APPLICATION	C: IO	D: IO SEARCH	E: BARGAINING - EXPERIMENTS	F: MATCHING	G: STRATEGY PROOFNESS	H: DYNAMIC GAMES	J: EQUILIBRIUM - LARGE GAMES	
	LOCATION >	C-1.03 A	C-1.05 A	C-1.09 A	C-1.07 A	G0.03 A	D0.03 A	G1.15 A	Lecture Hall A	HO.04 A	
09:00		<i>Tomasz Szdzik and Pavel Andreyanov</i> Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange	<i>Younghwan In</i> Jump bidding in FCC spectrum auctions	<i>Nicolas Fugger, Florian Gössl and Joachim Heinzel</i> Credence goods markets with heterogeneous experts	<i>Dhruva Bhaskar</i> Tempting and Testing Through Costly Monitoring	<i>Alex Possajennikov and Rene Saran</i> Private Value Bargaining with Naive Players: Theory and Experiment	<i>Mu Zhang</i> Multi-period Matching with Commitment	<i>Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa</i> Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Tiered Objects Preferences	<i>Pieter Collins and Frank Thuijsman</i> Interior-Point Methods for Dynamic Markov Games	<i>Xiang Sun, Yeneng Sun and Haomiao Yu</i> Type-Symmetric Randomized Equilibrium	
09:30		<i>Sergei Izmalkov, Dilyara Khakimova and Gleb Romanyuk</i> Position auctions with endogenous supply	<i>Simon Loertscher and Cedric Wasser</i> Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships	<i>Nejat Anbarci and Nick Feltovich</i> Market Institutions, Efficiency and Prices	<i>Karl Schlag and Andriy Zapechelnyuk</i> Robust Sequential Search	<i>Matthew Embrey, Kyle Hyndman and Arno Riedl</i> Bargaining with a Residual Claimant: An Experimental Study	<i>Britta Hoyer and Nadja Maraun</i> Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents in a University Clearinghouse	<i>Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken</i> Partial Strategyproofness: An Axiomatic Approach to Relaxing Strategyproofness for Assignment Mechanisms	<i>Wei He and Yeneng Sun</i> Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information	<i>Peter Hammond</i> A Notion of Statistical Equilibrium for Games with Many Players	
10:00		<i>Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Anna Karlin and Balasubramanian Sivan</i> Simple Pricing Schemes for Consumers with Evolving Values	<i>Yair Tauman and Chang Zhao</i> Patent Licensing, Entry and the Incentive to Innovate		<i>Cristian Bartolucci and Ignacio Monzon</i> Frictions Lead to Sorting: a Partnership Model with On-the-Match Search	<i>Suntak Kim and Enseen Tang</i> An Experimental Study of Proposal Power in Legislative Bargaining	<i>Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Santiago Velez</i> Matching Problems with Priorities and Preferences: Compulsory Social Service Allocation in Colombia	<i>Lars Ehlers</i> Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores Revisited		<i>Guilherme Carmona</i> Nearly-Pure Equilibria of Large Games	
11:00-12:30	PARALLEL SESSIONS SUN11	A: AUCTIONS - PRICE DISCRIMINATION	B: AUCTIONS - PROCUREMENT	C: IO R&D	D: CONTRACTS	E: BARGAINING - DELAY	F: MATCHING	G: STRATEGY PROOFNESS	H: DYNAMIC GAMES	J: EQUILIBRIUM	
	LOCATION >	C-1.03 A	C-1.05 A	C-1.09 A	C-1.07 A	G0.03 A	D0.03 A	G1.15 A	Lecture Hall A	HO.04 A	
11:00		<i>Georgios Petropoulos</i> Optimal Selling Mechanisms for On-line Services I: Price Discrimination and the Risk of Interruption	<i>Jeannette Brosig-Koch and Timo Heinrich</i> Promises and Social Distance in Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions	<i>Shin Kishimoto</i> Stable Licensing Schemes in Technology Transfer	<i>Akifumi Ishihara</i> On Multitasking and Job Design in Relational Contracts	<i>Jean-Jacques Herings and Harold Houba</i> Costless Delay in Negotiation	<i>Stefano Duca, Dirk Helbing and Heinrich H. Nax</i> Assortative matching with inequality in voluntary contribution games	<i>Patrick Harless</i> From behind the veil: Evaluating allocation rules by ex-ante properties	<i>Leon Petrosyan</i> Strongly Time-Consistent Solutions in N-person Differential and Dynamic Games.	<i>Ibrahim Inal</i> Purification without Common Knowledge of Priors	
11:30		<i>Nima Haghpahan and Jason Hartline</i> Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination	<i>Daniel Z. Li and Minbo Xu</i> Competition in Procurement Auctions with Corruption	<i>Herbert Dawid and Tim Hellmann</i> R&D Investments under Endogenous Cluster Formation	<i>Daniel Danau and Annalisa Vinella</i> On the optimal use of correlated information in contractual design under limited liability	<i>Deepal Basak</i> Transparency and Delay in Bargaining	<i>Chia-Ling Hsu</i> Promoting Diversity of Talents: A Market Design Approach	<i>Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Markus Brill</i> On the Tradeoff between Efficiency and Strategyproofness	<i>Dmitry Khlopin</i> On Tauberian Theorems for Dynamic Games	<i>Rongyu Wang</i> Information Correlation in a Strategic-Complements Game and the Extension of Purification Theorem	
12:00					<i>Matthew Elluman and Sjaak Hurkens</i> Optimal Crowdfunding Design	<i>Dongkyu Chang</i> Delay in Bargaining with Outside Options	<i>P. Jean-Jacques Herings</i> Equilibrium and Matching under Price Controls	<i>William Thomson and Jo Cho</i> Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear economies	<i>Janos Flesch and Arkadi Predtetchinski</i> A characterization of subgame-perfect equilibrium plays in Borel games of perfect information	<i>Rohan Dutta, David Levine and Salvatore Modica</i> Collusion Constrained Equilibrium	
14:00-15:30	SEMI-PLENARY SESSIONS I	SP1: MATCHING AND MARKETS / VOTING VERSUS LOBBYING			SP2: CONTINUOUS-TIME AND STOCHASTIC GAMES			SP3: ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR			
	LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A			Concert Hall D			Greek Aula C			
14:00		<i>Chris Shannon</i> Matching and Markets			<i>Pierre Cardaliaguet</i> Learning in nonatomic continuous time games			<i>Jeff Shamma</i> Higher order evolutionary dynamics in population games			
14:45		<i>David Levine</i> Voting versus Lobbying			<i>Eilon Solan</i> Multiplayer Stochastic Games: Techniques, Results, and Open Problems			<i>Arthur Robson</i> Rapidly Adaptive Hedonic Utility			
16:00-17:30	PARALLEL SESSIONS SUN16	A: AUCTIONS - OPTIMAL	B: AUCTIONS - EXPERIMENTS	C: IO PRICE COMPETITION	D: CONTRACTS	E: BARGAINING	F: MATCHING	G: STRATEGY PROOFNESS	H: REPEATED GAMES	J: EQUILIBRIUM - EXISTENCE	
	LOCATION >	C-1.03 A	C-1.05 A	C-1.09 A	C-1.07 A	G0.03 A	D0.03 A	G1.15 A	Lecture Hall A	HO.04 A	
16:00		<i>Saeed Alaei, Jason Hartline, Rad Niazadeh, Emmanouil Pountourakis and Yang Yuan</i> Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing	<i>Joyce Delnoij</i> Compare and despair: social comparison concerns in auctions	<i>R. Emre Aytimur</i> Salience and Horizontal Differentiation	<i>Daniel Danau and Annalisa Vinella</i> Sequential screening and the relationship between principal's preferences and agent's incentives	<i>S. Nageeb Ali, David Miller and David Yilin Yang</i> Is multilateral enforcement vulnerable to bilateral renegotiation?	<i>Philip Marx and James Schummer</i> Revenue from Matching Platforms	<i>James Schummer and Rodrigo Velez</i> Sequential preference revelation in incomplete information settings	<i>Lawrence Blume and Klaus Ritzberger</i> The Curse of Poverty and the Blessings of Wealth	<i>Maria Carmela Ceparano and Federico Quartieri</i> Nash equilibrium uniqueness in nice games with isotone best replies	
16:30		<i>Takehiro Oyakawa, Amy Greenwald and Vasilis Syrgkanis</i> Optimal Auctions with Convex Perceived Payments	<i>Gali Noti, Noam Nisan and Ilan Yaniv</i> An Experimental Evaluation of Bidders' Behavior in Ad Auctions	<i>Abhimanyu Khan and Ronald Peeters</i> Imitation and price competition in a differentiated market	<i>Andrei Barbos</i> Optimal Contracts with Random Auditing	<i>Armando Gomes</i> Coalitional Bargaining: A New Concept of Value and Coalition Formation	<i>Orhan Aygun and Bertan Turhan</i> Dynamic Reserves in Matching Markets With Contracts: Theory and Applications	<i>Peter Biro, Flip Klijn and Szilvia Papai</i> Circulation under Responsive Preferences	<i>Kutay Cingiz, János Flesch, Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski</i> Perfect information games with infinitely many players each acting only once	<i>Rabah Amir and Luciano De Castro</i> Nash Equilibrium in Games with Quasi-Monotonic Best-Responses	
17:00		<i>Shuchi Chawla, Hu Fu and Anna Karlin</i> Simple, Approximately Optimal Auctions for Interdependent Value Settings	<i>Dirk Engelmann, Jeff Frank, Alexander Koch and Marieta Valente</i> Does a Buyer Benefit from Bad Reputation? Theory and Experiments on Auctions with Default		<i>Sarah Auster and Piero Gottardi</i> Competing Mechanisms in Markets for Lemons	<i>Mantas Radzvilas</i> Hypothetical Bargaining and Envy-Free Gameplay	<i>Antonio Romero-Medina and Matteo Triossi</i> Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets		<i>Oscar Volij and Casilda Lasso de La Vega</i> The value of a draw in quasi-binary matches	<i>Takahiro Watanabe</i> Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Quasiconcave Games	
18:00-19:30	WELCOME AND PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS										
		<i>David Schmeidler</i>									
	LOCATION >	Vrijthof theatre E									

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // SUNDAY 24 JULY 2016

K: LEARNING	L: CONTESTS		N: NETWORKS	P: PSYCHOLOGY	Q: EPISTEMICS	R: COOPERATIVE - NUCLEOLUS	S: STOCHASTIC GAMES	T: TEAMS	U: PREDICTION
H0.06 A	G1.01 A		AO.24 A	EO.04 A	0.012 B	0.011 B	0.010 B	0.009 B	0.008 B
<i>Burkhard Schipper</i> Strategic teaching and learning in games	<i>Caleb Koch and Heinrich Nax</i> Contests Evolving		<i>Catherine Moon and Vincent Conitzer</i> Maximal Cooperation in Repeated Games on Social Networks	<i>Nick Janetos</i> Fads and changing tastes	<i>Yasuo Sasaki</i> Unawareness of Decision Criteria in Multicriteria Games	<i>Tamas Solymosi and Balázs Sziklai</i> Characterization sets for the nucleolus in balanced games	<i>Mickael Randour</i> Reconciling Rationality and Stochasticity: Rich Behavioral Models in Two-Player Games	<i>Aodi Tang</i> Optimal Contracts for team experimentation	<i>Xi Alice Gao, Andrew Mao, Yiling Chen and Ryan Adams</i> Trick or Treat: Putting Peer Prediction to the Test
<i>Ai Takeuchi, Yukihiko Funaki, Mamoru Kaneko and Jeffrey Kline</i> An Experiment on Behavior, Learning, and Forgetfulness in Inductive Game Theory	<i>Christian Seel</i> The Reverse War of Attrition		<i>Pramod Mane, Kapil Ahuja and Nagarajan Krishnamurthy</i> Unique Stability Point in Social Storage	<i>Stefanie Schmitt</i> Rational Allocation of Attention in Decision-Making	<i>Kemal Yildiz</i> Choice Regularities Relative identification of choice theories	<i>Javier Martinez-De-Albeniz, Carlos Rafels and Neus Ybern</i> Insights into the nucleolus of the assignment game	<i>Dipti Dubey and S. K. Neogy</i> Completely Mixed Strategies for Generalized Bimatrix and Switching Controller Stochastic Game using Vertical Linear Complementarity Problem	<i>Alex Gershkov, Jianpei Li and Paul Schweinzer</i> How to share it out: The value of information in teams	<i>Yiling Chen and Bo Waggoner</i> Informational Substitutes for Prediction and Play
<i>Chiara Margaria</i> Queueing to learn	<i>Greg Kubitz</i> Repeated Contests with Private Information		<i>Mikhail Raskin and Nikita Nikitenkov</i> Paradoxical examples of games on social networks	<i>Aileen Lotz, Pierre Gosselin and Marc Wambst</i> From Rationality to Irrationality: Dynamic Interacting Structures	<i>Michael Greinecker</i> Typology of beliefs and rationalizability with many players	<i>Yin-Fang Ye, Deng-Feng Li and Xun-Feng Hu</i> A monotony-based simplified method for computing interval least square prenucleolus of interval cooperative games	<i>S. K. Neogy and Dipti Dubey</i> Linear Complementarity and the class of Structured Stochastic Games		
K: LEARNING	L: CONTESTS	M: COMMUNICATION	N: NETWORKS	P: BIASES	Q: EPISTEMICS	R: COOPERATIVE - STABLE SETS	S: POLITICAL ECONOMY	T: SHARING	U: FUZZY, QUANTUM
H0.06 A	G1.01 A	AO.23 A	AO.24 A	EO.04 A	0.012 B	0.011 B	0.010 B	0.009 B	0.008 B
<i>Ye Du and Ehud Lehrer</i> Constrained No Regret Learning	<i>Alexandros Rigos</i> A Beauty Contest with Flexible Information Acquisition	<i>Thomas Rivera</i> Incentives and the Structure of Communication	<i>Vincent Boucher and Marion Goussé</i> Wage Dynamics and Peer Referrals	<i>Jakub Steiner and Olivier Gossner</i> Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases	<i>Pierfrancesco Guarino</i> The Universal Type Space with Unawareness for Conditional Probability Systems	<i>Weibin Han and Adrain van Deemen</i> On Generalized Stable Sets	<i>Frederik Toscani and Daniel Quigley</i> The roles of transparency in regime change: Striking when the iron's gone cold	<i>Ruben Juarez, Chiu Yu Ko and Jingyi Xue</i> Sharing sequential profits in a network	<i>Ulrich Faigle and Michel Grabisch</i> Quantum Analysis of Decision and Interaction Systems
<i>Annie Liang</i> Games of Incomplete Information Played by Statisticians	<i>Aidas Masiliunas, Friederike Mengel and J. Philipp Reiss</i> Behavioural Variation in Tullock Contests	<i>Vessela Daskalova and Nicolaas J. Vriend</i> Categorization and Coordination	<i>Mehrdad Nojournian and Douglas Stinson</i> From Rational Secret Sharing to Social and Socio-Rational Secret Sharing	<i>Roe Teper and Ehud Lehrer</i> Who is a Bayesian?	<i>Jayant Ganguli, Aviad Heifetz and Byung Soo Lee</i> Universal Interactive Preferences	<i>Parkash Chander</i> An Infinitely Farsighted Stable Set	<i>Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin</i> Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy: Re-evaluating De Tocqueville	<i>Eric Bahel and Christian Trudeau</i> From spanning trees to arborescences: new and extended cost sharing solutions	<i>Dian Qing Yang and Deng Feng Li</i> Multilinear extension of tau-values for cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions
<i>In-Koo Cho and Anna Rubinchik</i> Contemplation vs. intuition. A reinforcement learning perspective.	<i>Damian Damianov, Shane Sanders and Anil Yildizparlak</i> Asymmetric endogenous prize contests			<i>János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen and Anna Zseleva</i> Zero-sum games with charges		<i>Toshiyuki Hirai</i> Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies	<i>Jiabin Wu</i> Homo-Politicus: Evolution of Behavior Under Political Institutions	<i>Ruben Juarez and Lining Han</i> Money-Sharing and Intermediation in Networks	<i>Jie Yang and Deng-Feng Li</i> Parameterized Bilinear Programming Methodology for Solving Triangular Intuitionistic Fuzzy Number Bimatrix Games
K: LEARNING	L: CONTESTS	M: COMMUNICATION	N: NETWORKS	P: RISK AND AMBIGUITY	Q: EPISTEMICS	R: COOPERATIVE	S: POLITICAL ECONOMY	T: SHARING	U: ENVIRONMENT
H0.06 A	G1.01 A	AO.23 A	AO.24 A	EO.04 A	0.012 B	0.011 B	0.010 B	0.009 B	0.008 B
<i>Jesper Rudiger and Adrien Vigier</i> Pundits and Quacks: Learning about Analysts when Fundamental Asset Values are Unobserved	<i>Ayse Gul Mermer</i> Effort Provision and Optimal Prize Structure in Contests with Loss-Averse Players	<i>Tom Potoms and Tom Truys</i> On Symbols and Cooperation	<i>Penelope Hernandez, Guillem Martinez, Manuel Monos-Herrera and Angel Sanchez</i> Individual preferences and networks	<i>Takashi Ui</i> Ambiguity and Risk in Global Games	<i>Elias Tsakas and Andres Perea</i> Local reasoning in dynamic games	<i>Yukihiko Funaki, Koji Yokote and Takumi Kongo</i> The balanced contribution property for equal contributors	<i>Kaj Thomsson and Richard Bluhm</i> Ethnic divisions, political institutions and the duration of declines	<i>Tatsuya Iwase and Takahiro Shiga</i> Pure Nash Equilibrium and Coordination of Players in Ride Sharing Games	<i>Eugen Kovac and Robert Schmidt</i> A simple dynamic climate cooperation model with large coalitions and deep emissions cuts
<i>Rahul Deb and Colin Stewart</i> Optimal Adaptive Testing: Informativeness and Incentives	<i>Alex Smolin</i> Optimal Feedback Design	<i>Juan Carlos Carbajal</i> Inconspicuous Consumption	<i>Michel Grabisch, Antoine Mandel, Agnieszka Rusinowska and Emily Tanimura</i> Strategic influence in social networks	<i>Satoshi Nakada and Kohei Sashida</i> Risk and Ambiguity in the Twin Crises	<i>Nadine Chlass and Andrés Perea</i> How Do People Reason In Dynamic Games?	<i>Colin Rowat, Manfred Kerber and Naoki Yoshihara</i> Asymmetric three agent majority pillage games	<i>Shyh-Fang Ueng</i> Perception and Inclusiveness	<i>Jason Marden, Raghavendra Gopalakrishnan and Adam Wierman</i> Potential Games are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games	<i>Adam Lampert, Alan Hastings and James Sanchirico</i> Ecosystem restoration by multiple agents
<i>Alan Beggs</i> Reference Points and Learning	<i>Gleb Polevoy, Stojan Trajanovski and Mathijs de Weerd</i> Equilibria and Efficiency in Shared Effort Games	<i>Michael Mandler</i> Piracy versus monopoly in the market for conspicuous consumption	<i>Hannu Salonen</i> Bonach Measures as Equilibria in Network Models	<i>Toomas Hinnosaar</i> On the impossibility of protecting risk-takers	<i>Miklos Pinter</i> A new epistemic model	<i>Jose-Manuel Giménez-Gómez and Cori Vilella</i> Recursive methods for discrete claims problems with social constraints	<i>Jidong Chen and Yiqing Xu</i> How Does an Authoritarian Regime Allow Citizens to Voice Opinion Publicly?	<i>Arnold Polanski and Fernando Vega-Redondo</i> Coalition formation and surplus sharing in repeated multi-coalitional games	

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // MONDAY 25 JULY 2016

K: EXPERIMENTATION	L: CONTESTS	M: COMMUNICATION - DISCLOSURE	N: NETWORKS	P: RISK - BIDDING	Q: EXTENSIVE GAMES	R: COOPERATIVE	S: VOTING	T: GROUPS	
HO.06 A	G1.01 A	AO.23 A	AO.24 A	EO.04 A	O.012 B	O.011 B	O.010 B	O.009 B	
<i>Yi Chen</i> Strategic Experimentation on a Common Threshold	<i>Jean-Francois Mercier</i> Selecting Contestants for a Rent-Seeking Contest: a Mechanism Design Approach	<i>Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel and Barton Lipman</i> Disclosure and Choice	<i>Niccolo Lomys</i> Sequential Collective Search in Networks	<i>Philippos Louis and Dimitrios Xeferis</i> Others' risk attitudes: lessons from a game of poker.	<i>Larry Blume and Martin Meier</i> Perfect quasi-perfect equilibrium	<i>Seckin Ozbilen</i> Coalitional Nash stability in hedonic coalition formation games	<i>Hans Gersbach, Philippe Muller and Oriol Tejada</i> A Dynamic Model of Electoral Competition with Costly Policy Changes	<i>Christopher Kops and Abhinash Borah</i> Self-Categorization, Depersonalization and Rational Choice	
<i>Kaustav Das</i> The Role of Heterogeneity in a model of Strategic Experimentation	<i>Ryuji Sano</i> Iterative Revelation Mechanisms	<i>Stefan Penczynski and Sihong Zhang</i> Disclosure of Verifiable Information under Competition	<i>László Kóczy</i> Core-stable Networks with Widespread Externalities	<i>Zhuoqiong Chen, David Ong and Ella Segev</i> Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auction	<i>Sune K. Jakobsen, Troels B. Lund and Vincent Conitzer</i> Timeability of Extensive-Form Games	<i>Dinko Dimitrov and Emiliya Lazarova</i> Inducing stability in hedonic games	<i>R. Pablo Arribillaga and Jordi Massó</i> Comparing Voting by Committees According to their Manipulability	<i>Aidas Masiliunas</i> Overcoming Coordination Failure in a Critical Mass Game	
<i>Daria Khromenkova</i> Restless Strategic Experimentation	<i>Anna Moskalenko</i> A mechanism to pick the deserving winner	<i>Keiichi Kawai and Pak Hung Au</i> Competition in Information Disclosure	<i>Mihai Suci, Rodica Ioana Lung and Noémi Gaskó</i> About Nash Equilibrium, Modularity Optimization, and Network Community Structure Detection	<i>Philippe Gillen, Christopher Zeppenfeld, Alexander Rasch and Nicolas Fugger</i> Preferences and Decision Support in Competitive Bidding	<i>Roger Myerson and Philip Reny</i> Open Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions	<i>Marieke Musegaas, Peter Borm and Marieke Quant</i> Step out - Step in Sequencing Games		<i>Willemien Kets and Alvaro Sandroni</i> Challenging Conformity: A Case for Diversity	

K: PUBLIC GOOD	L: CONTESTS	M: COMMUNICATION	N: NETWORKS	P: AMBIGUITY	Q: EXTENSIVE GAMES	R: COOPERATIVE GAMES	S: VOTING	T: FORECASTING	
HO.06 A	G1.01 A	AO.23 A	AO.24 A	EO.04 A	O.012 B	O.011 B	O.010 B	O.009 B	
<i>Renee Bowen, George Georgiadis and Nicolas Lambert</i> Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision: Real versus Formal Authority	<i>Qian Jiao, Jaimie Lien and Jie Zheng</i> Managing Competitions Using Information: Disclosure Policy in Contests with Heterogeneous Players	<i>Michele Dell'Era</i> Talking to Influence	<i>Gabrielle Demange</i> Optimal targeting strategy in a network under complementarities	<i>Adam Dominiak and Juergen Eichberger</i> Equilibrium under Ambiguity (EUA) for Belief Functions	<i>Andrés Perea</i> Forward induction reasoning versus equilibrium reasoning	<i>Gustavo Bergantiños, Youngsub Chun and Leticia Lorenzo</i> Minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources: the folk rule	<i>Volker Britz and Hans Gersbach</i> Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms	<i>Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart</i> Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, Finite Recall, and Nash Dynamics	
<i>Andreas Reischmann</i> Conditional Contribution Mechanisms for the Provision of Public Goods in Dynamic Settings - Theory and Experimental Evidence	<i>Chu-Han Cheng, Po-An Chen and Wing-Kai Hon</i> Budget-Constrained Multi-Battle Contests: A New Perspective and Analysis	<i>Andres Salamanca</i> The Value of Mediated Communication	<i>Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan</i> Networks of Complements	<i>Philippe Bich</i> Ambiguity in Discontinuous Games	<i>Christina Pawlowitsch and Rida Laraki</i> Invariant extensive-form rationalizability	<i>Loe Schlicher, Marco Slikker and Geert-Jan van Houtum</i> Spare parts pooling games under a critical level policy	<i>Dimitrios Xeferis and Nicholas Ziros</i> Strategic vote trading in power-sharing systems	<i>Luciano Pomatto</i> Testable Forecasts	
<i>Edward Cartwright and Federica Alberti</i> Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods	<i>Lambert Schoonbeek</i> Information and endogenous delegation in a rent-seeking contest	<i>Martin Gregor</i> Bilateral transactions with evidence	<i>Gaëtan Fournier and Marco Scarsini</i> Hotelling Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria	<i>Ilan Nehama</i> Analyzing games with ambiguous types using the MINthenMAX decision model		<i>Peter Sudhölter and José Zarzuelo</i> Characterizations of solutions to highway cost allocation problems	<i>Steve Alpern and Bo Chen</i> Who Should Cast the Casting Vote? Using Sequential Voting to Amalgamate Information		

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // TUESDAY 26 JULY 2016

09:00-10:30	PARALLEL SESSIONS TUE9	A: AUCTIONS - BAYESIAN	B: IO ESPIONAGE	C: IO TIMING	D: FINANCIAL; INVESTMENT	E: BARGAINING	F: MATCHING	G: STRATEGY PROOFNESS	H: REPEATED GAMES	J: EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS	
	LOCATION >	C-1.03 A	C-1.05 A	C-1.09 A	C-1.07 A	G0.03 A	G1.01 A	A1.23 A	DO.03 A	HO.04 A	
09:00		<i>Elnaz Bajoori</i> Distributional Perfect Equilibrium in Bayesian Games with Applications to Auctions	<i>Alex Barrachina, Yair Tauman and Amparo Urbano</i> Entry with Two Correlated Signals	<i>Thomas Weber</i> Optimal Commitment	<i>Yong Chao, Chen Yao and Mao Ye</i> What drives price dispersion and market fragmentation across U.S. stock exchanges?	<i>Haruo Imai and Hannu Salonen</i> Bargaining and Rentseeking	<i>Aaron Bodoh-Creed and Brent Hickman</i> College assignment as a large contest	<i>Frank Karsten, Marco Slikker and Peter Borm</i> Cost allocation rules for elastic single-attribute situations	<i>Takuo Sugaya</i> The Characterization of the Limit Communication Equilibrium Payoff Set with General Monitoring	<i>Panayotis Mertikopoulos and William Sandholm</i> Riemannian game dynamics and reinforcement learning	
09:30		<i>Christian Koch and Stefania Penczynski</i> The Winner's Curse: Conditional Reasoning & Belief Formation	<i>Maria Kozlovskaya</i> Industrial Espionage in Duopoly Games	<i>Steven Slutsky and Jon Hamilton</i> Optimal income taxation with no government commitment	<i>Yunus Topbas and Unal Zenginobuz</i> Horizontal Coordination and Transparency of Information	<i>Cesarino Bertini, Cristina Bonzi, Gianfranco Gambarelli, Nicola Gnocchi and Ignazio Panades</i> Transforming Games with Affinities from Characteristic into Normal Form	<i>Koji Yokote</i> Cumulative offer process with continuous transfers	<i>William Phan and Patrick Harless</i> For the Object Allocation Problem, Efficiency, the Partial Endowment Lower Bound, and Decomposability Characterize TTC	<i>Mitri Kitti</i> Equilibrium Payoffs for Pure Strategies in Repeated Games	<i>Man Wah Cheung</i> Imitative Dynamics for Games with Continuous Strategy Space	
10:00		<i>Matthew Gentry, Tatiana Komarova, Pasquale Schiraldi and Wiroy Shin</i> On Monotone Strategy Equilibria in Simultaneous Auctions for Complementary Goods		<i>Suvi Vasama</i> Dynamics of Innovation: Cooperation and Retardation	<i>Lin Lin, Wei Zheng and Yan Pan</i> Game Analysis of the Corporate Internet Information Disclosure	<i>Joosung Lee</i> Bargaining and Buyout	<i>Mustafa Oguz Afacan</i> School Choice with Voucher	<i>Ethem Akyol</i> Welfare Comparison of Allocation Mechanisms under Incomplete Information	<i>Asaf Plan</i> Stability of the Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated Games	<i>Erik Mohlin and Axel Bergner</i> Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies	
11:00-12:30	SEMI-PLENARY SESSIONS III	SP1: COMPUTATION			SP2: DYNAMIC MATCHING			SP3: MONOPOLY PRICING / PRISONER'S DILEMMA			
	LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A			Concert Hall D			Aula Gothic A			
11:00		<i>Christos Papadimitriou</i> The Unreasonably Productive Interaction of the Theories of Games and Computation			<i>Leeat Yariv</i> Optimal Dynamic Matching			<i>Balázs Szentes</i> Buyer-Optimal Demand and Monopoly Pricing			
11:45		<i>Rakesh Vohra</i> Scarf's Lemma and Stable Matchings			<i>Alessandro Pavan</i> Dynamic Matching Auctions: Experimentation and Cross-Subsidization			<i>Guillaume Fréchette</i> Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma			
14:00-15:30	POSTER SESSION										
	LOCATION >	Lounge SBE A									
16:00-17:30	PARALLEL SESSIONS TUE16	A: AUCTIONS - COMMUNICATION	B: IO COASE CONJECTURE	C: IO	D: AGENCY MODELS	E: BARGAINING	F: MATCHING	G: SOLUTION CONCEPTS	H: REPEATED GAMES	J: EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS	
	LOCATION >	C-1.03 A	C-1.05 A	C-1.09 A	C-1.07 A	G0.03 A	G1.01 A	A1.23 A	DO.03 A	HO.04 A	
16:00		<i>Peter Troyan</i> Collusion and Signaling in Auctions with Interdependent Values	<i>Vitali Gretschko and Achim Wambach</i> Common Values and the Coase Conjecture: Inefficiencies in Frictionless Contract (Re-) Negotiation	<i>Jan Bouckaert and Geert Van Moer</i> Mergers with Horizontal Subcontracting	<i>Matthias Lang</i> Communicating Subjective Evaluations	<i>David Lagziel and Ehud Lehrer</i> Reward Schemes	<i>Azar Abizada</i> Random paths to exchange-stability	<i>Xiao Luo</i> A Unified Approach to Iterated Elimination Procedures in Strategic Games	<i>Yonatan Aumann and Erel Segal-Halevi</i> Repeated Games Revisited: An Ordinal Perspective	<i>Cars Hommes, Marius Ochea and Jan Tuinstra</i> Evolutionary Competition between Adjustment Processes in Cournot Oligopoly: Instability and Complex Dynamics	
16:30		<i>Philippe Jehiel, Peter Katuscak and Fabio Michelucci</i> How to Boost Revenues in First-Price Auctions? The Magic of Disclosing Only Winning Bids from Past Auctions	<i>Basak Altan</i> Damaged Durable Goods, Upgrades and the Coase Conjecture	<i>Panos Toulis and David Parkes</i> Long-term Causal Effects in Multiagent Economies	<i>Andreas Asseuer</i> Optimal Information Disclosure and Collusion	<i>Andrzej Baranski</i> Pre-Distribution: Bargaining over Incentives with Endogenous Production	<i>John P. Dickerson and Tuomas Sandholm</i> FutureMatch: Combining Human Value Judgments and Machine Learning to Match in Dynamic Environments	<i>Mehmet Ismail Maximin</i> Equilibrium: A Minimal Extension of Maximin Strategies	<i>Artem Baklanov</i> Nash Equilibria in Reactive Strategies	<i>Hsiao-Chi Chen and Yunshyong Chow</i> Evolution of Cournot and Bertrand Firms Under A Replicator Dynamic	
17:00		<i>Gyula Seres</i> Auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication		<i>Amparo Urbano and Ivan Arribas</i> Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium	<i>Xiaogang Che</i> Collusion and Optimal Contract in a Hierarchy with Multiple Agents	<i>Gustavo Bergantiños and Leticia Lorenzo</i> How to apply penalties for avoiding delays in projects	<i>Jan Christoph Schlegel</i> Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries Have Small Support	<i>Toshimasa Maruta, Takuya Iimura and Takahiro Watanabe</i> Two-person Pairwise Solvable Games	<i>Fedor Sandmirskiy</i> On repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information and asymptotically bounded values	<i>Hamed Markazi Moghadam</i> The Nonparametric Approach to Evolutionary Oligopoly	
18:00-19:00	VON NEUMANN LECTURE	<i>Sylvain Sorin</i> Asymptotic Value of Dynamic Games									
	LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A									

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // TUESDAY 26 JULY 2016

K: PUBLIC GOOD	L: CONTESTS	M: COMMUNICATION	N: NETWORKS - IO	P: DECISION THEORY	Q: SEQUENTIAL RATIONALITY	R: COOPERATIVE	S: VOTING	T: FAIRNESS	U: EXPERIMENTS
HO.06 ^A	A1.22 ^A	AO.23 ^A	AO.24 ^A	EO.04 ^A	O.012 ^B	O.011 ^B	O.010 ^B	O.009 ^B	O.008 ^B
<i>Abhinaba Lahiri, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken</i> Locating public bads in an interval	<i>Antoni Rubí-Barceló and Daniel Cardona</i> Group-contests with endogenous claims	<i>Valeria Burdea, Maria Montero and Martin Sefton</i> Communication situations with partially verifiable information: an experimental approach	<i>Vladimir Matveenko, Alexei Korolev and Anastasia Alfimova</i> On dynamic stability of equilibrium in network game with production and externalities	<i>Massimo Scotti and Filippo Pavesi</i> Good Lies	<i>Marciano Siniscalchi</i> Sequential preferences and sequential rationality	<i>Giorgos Stamatopoulos and Paraskevas Lekeas</i> Cooperative games with externalities and probabilistic coalitional beliefs	<i>Steven Brams and Marc Kilgour</i> Paths to Victory in Presidential Elections: The Setup Power of Noncompetitive States	<i>Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Sabine Hügelschäfer and Maria Theobald</i> Unexpected, hence unfair? The neural response to expectancy violations in the Ultimatum Game	<i>Tibor Neugebauer, Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Reinhard Selten</i> Taming Selten's Horse with Impulse Response
<i>Swarnendu Chatterjee, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken</i> Locating a public good on a sphere	<i>Uriel Feige, Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz</i> Contests for Revenue Share	<i>Caroline Thomas</i> Career Concerns and Policy Intransigence - A Dynamic Signalling Model	<i>Nikolas Tsakas and Emmanuel Petrakis</i> The Effect of Entry on R&D Networks	<i>Hande Erkut</i> Individual preferences across contexts	<i>Sophie Bade</i> Weak Dynamic Consistency	<i>Zhigang Cao, Chengzhong Qin and Xiaoguang Yang</i> Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games	<i>Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Georg Granic</i> The effects of polling systems on electoral competition	<i>Takeshi Nishimura, Akira Okada and Yasuhiro Shirata</i> Evolution of Fairness and Group Formation in Multi-Player Ultimatum Games	<i>Carlos Alos-Ferrer and Alexander Ritschel</i> Multiple Decision Processes in Cournot Oligopolies: Evidence from Response Times
<i>Alexey Savvateev, Constantine Sorokin and Shlomo Weber</i> Multidimensional free-mobility equilibrium: Tiebout revisited	<i>Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno and Benyamin Shitovitz</i> The Value of Public Information in Common-Value Tullock Contests	<i>Bartosz Redlicki</i> Rumours and Cheap Talk	<i>Sonja Brangewitz, Claus-Jochen Haake and Philipp Möhlmeier</i> Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks		<i>Eran Hanany, Peter Klibanoff and Sujoy Mukerji</i> Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players	<i>María Gómez-Rúa and Juan Vidal-Puga</i> A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations	<i>Javier Rivas and Friederike Mengel</i> Common value elections with private information and informative priors		<i>Andrea Isoni, Anders Poulsen, Robert Sugden and Kei Tsutsui</i> Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining

K: PUBLIC GOOD	L: CONTESTS	M: COMMUNICATION	N: NETWORKS	P: PSYCHOLOGY	Q: DEPTH OF REASONING	R: COOPERATIVE	S: VOTING	T: FAIRNESS	U: EXPERIMENTS - MONEY
HO.06 ^A	A1.22 ^A	AO.23 ^A	AO.24 ^A	EO.04 ^A	O.012 ^B	O.011 ^B	O.010 ^B	O.009 ^B	O.008 ^B
<i>Péter Bayer</i> Sophisticatedly Stable Equilibria in the Local Public Goods Game	<i>Marco Serena</i> Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts	<i>Tymofiy Mylovanov</i> The sender-payoff approach to signaling and the informed-principal problem	<i>Norma Olaizola and Federico Valenciano</i> A "marginalist" model of network formation	<i>Claudia Cerrone</i> Doing it when others do: a strategic model of procrastination	<i>Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg, Terri Kneeland and Willemien Kets</i> Cognition and Rationality	<i>Parkash Chander and Myrna Wooders</i> The Subgame Perfect Core	<i>Stephan Lauerermann and Mehmet Ekmekci</i> Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation	<i>M. Josune Albizuri and J. Carlos Santos</i> Claims-separable consistency and potential for claims problems	<i>Miguel Fonseca, Francesco Giovannoni and Miltiadis Makris</i> Auctions with External Incentives: Experimental Evidence
<i>Anna Stepanova and Edward Cartwright</i> Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game	<i>Irem Bozbay and Alberto Vesperoni</i> A contest success function for networks	<i>Yi Chen, Maria Goltsman, Johannes Horner and Gregory Pavlov</i> Multi-stage unmediated communication in a sender-receiver model	<i>Renaud Foucard and Jana Friedrichsen</i> Bidding for network size	<i>Aviad Heifetz and Enrico Minelli</i> Gratification and flourishing: well-being in interaction	<i>Bernardo Garcia-Pola, Nagore Iriberrí and Jaromir Kovarik</i> Non-Equilibrium Play in Centipede Games	<i>Fanni Bobák and Zsolt Udvari</i> Games in partition function form with restricted cooperation	<i>Irem Bozbay and Hans Peters</i> Information aggregation with multiple issues and continuum of types	<i>Florian Navarro</i> Weak necessary players, Myerson fairness and the concept of equality	<i>Markus Kinateder, Hubert Kiss and Ágnes Pintér</i> Would Depositors pay to show that they do not withdraw? Theory and Experiment
<i>Anne Van Den Nouweland and Myrna Wooders</i> Existence of Share Equilibrium in Symmetric Local Public Good Economies	<i>Subhasish Modak-Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee and Theodore Turocy</i> Equivalence in multi-winner contest mechanisms: An experiment	<i>Francesc Dilme</i> Slightly Biased Communication	<i>Rui Gong, Jieshuang He and Frank Page</i> Incentive Compatible Networks and the Delegated Networking Principle		<i>Romain Gauriot, Lionel Gauthier and John Wooders</i> Wimbledon Revisited	<i>Hakan Inal</i> Existence of a Unique Core Partition in Coalition Formation Games	<i>Addison Pan</i> A Generalisation of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998): Voting Under Ambiguity	<i>Jingyi Xue</i> Efficiency and fairness in claims problems under uncertainty	<i>Olga Gorelkina and Alia Gizatulina</i> Selling Money on eBay: A Field Test for Social Preferences

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // WEDNESDAY 27 JULY 2016

09:00-10:30	PARALLEL SESSIONS WED9	A: AUCTIONS - DESIGN	B: IO MONOPOLY	C: IO	D: AGENCY MODELS	E: BANKRUPTCY	F: SCHOOL CHOICE	G: SOLUTION CONCEPTS	H: IMPLEMENTATION	J: EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS
	LOCATION >	C-1.03 A	C-1.05 A	C-1.09 A	C-1.07 A	G0.03 A	G1.01 A	A1.23 A	DO.03 A	H0.04 A
	09:00	<i>Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Noam Nisan</i> The Menu-Size Complexity of Revenue Approximation	<i>Daniele Condorelli and Balazs Szentes</i> Buyer-Optimal Demand and Monopoly Pricing	<i>Tatsuya Kitagawa, Yasushi Masuda and Masashi Umezawa</i> Optimal Two-part Tariff Licensing for Incumbent Innovator in Differentiated Product Markets	<i>Martin Pollrich</i> Mediated Audits	<i>Arantza Estevez Fernandez, Peter Borm and M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro</i> Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games	<i>Joana Pais, Flip Klijn and Marc Vorsatz</i> Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment	<i>Bram Driesen</i> Truncated Leximin Solutions	<i>Naoki Yoshihara and Michele Lombardi</i> Partially-honest Nash implementation with non-connected honesty standards	<i>Noémi Gaskó, Rodica Ioana Lung and Mihai Suciu</i> Approximation of Generalized Nash Equilibria by Means of Evolutionary Computation
	09:30	<i>Debasis Mishra and Tridib Sharma</i> Balanced Ranking Mechanisms	<i>Robert Somogyi</i> Monopoly Pricing with Dual Capacity Constraints	<i>Filippo Balestrieri, Sergei Izmalkov and Joao Leao</i> The Market for Surprises: Selling Substitute Goods through Lotteries	<i>Albin Erlanson and Andreas Kleiner</i> Costly Verification in Collective Decisions	<i>Jiawen Li and Yuan Ju</i> Divide and Choose: A strategic approach to bankruptcy problems	<i>Thayer Morrill and Umut Dur</i> What you don't know can help you in school assignment	<i>Florian Brandl</i> The Distribution of Optimal Strategies in Symmetric Zero-sum Games	<i>Michele Lombardi</i> Implementation in partial equilibrium	<i>Linh Chi Nguyen</i> Evolution of Behavior in the Repeated Nash Demand Game. A Computer Simulation.
	10:00	<i>Cemil Selcuk</i> Auctions vs. Fixed Pricing: Competing for Budget Constrained Buyers	<i>V Bhaskar and Nikita Roketskiy</i> Dynamic Demand and Sequential Monopoly: A Model of Endogenous Screening	<i>Michael Kramm and Maximilian Conze</i> The Recommendation Effect of Niche Products - How Consumer Learning in a Hotelling Framework Leads to Differentiation	<i>Erik Madsen</i> Optimal project termination with an informed agent	<i>Genjia Xu, Cuiying Zhu, Jun Su and Hao Sun</i> A bankrupt approach to solutions of TU Games	<i>Felix Brandt, Markus Brill and Warut Suksompong</i> An Ordinal Minimax Theorem	<i>Makoto Hagiwara, Hirofumi Yamamura and Takehiko Yamato</i> An Outcome Mechanism for Partially Honest Nash Implementation	<i>Mareen Hallier and Carsten Hartmann</i> A Markov state modeling approach to characterizing the punctuated equilibrium dynamics of stochastic evolutionary games	
11:00-12:30	SEMI-PLENARY SESSIONS IV	SPO: EC PLENARY / KALAI PRIZE		SP1: GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY		SP2: ORGAN EXCHANGE / INFORMATION ACQUISITION		SP3: LAW		
	LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A		Concert Hall D		Greek Aula C		Aula Gothic A		
	11:00	<i>Keith Chen</i> Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surge Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber Platform		<i>Colin Camerer</i> Neural circuitry of strategic thinking		<i>Utku Ünver</i> Multi-Donor Organ Exchange		<i>Wojciech Zaluski</i> Law as a Convention: Remarks on a Game-Theoretical Insight into Legal Ontology		
	11:45	<i>Tim Roughgarden</i> Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy		<i>Avi Shmida</i> Game theory and evolution		<i>Hülya Eraslan</i> Information Acquisition under Persuasive Precedent versus Binding Precedent				
14:00-15:30	PARALLEL SESSIONS WED14	A: AUCTIONS - COMBINATORIAL	B: IO TRADE	C: IO LEARNING	D: REPUTATION	E: PRIVACY	F: SCHOOL CHOICE	G: EQUILIBRIUM	H: IMPLEMENTATION	J: EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS
	LOCATION >	C-1.03 A	C-1.05 A	C-1.07 A	C-1.09 A	G0.03 A	G1.01 A	A1.23 A	DO.03 A	H0.04 A
	14:00	<i>Gian-Marco Kokott, Martin Bichler and Per Paulsen</i> Equilibrium Bidding Strategies in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions with Diseconomies of Scale	<i>Saara Hamalainen</i> Competition in store complexity takes us halfway between Diamond and Bertrand	<i>Alexei Parakhonyak and Nick Vikander</i> Inducing Herding with Capacity Constraints	<i>Nuh Aygun Dalkiran and Serdar Yuksel</i> Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Reputation Games with Nested Information Structure	<i>Ronen Gradwohl and Rann Smorodinsky</i> Perception Games and Privacy	<i>Li Chen and Juan Pereyra</i> Self-selection in School Choice	<i>Shiran Rachmilevitch</i> Monotonic epsilon-equilibria in strongly symmetric games	<i>Rene Saran</i> Bounded Depths of Rationality and Implementation with Complete Information	<i>Sung-Ha Hwang and Luc Rey-Bellet</i> Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
	14:30	<i>Marissa Beck and Marion Ott</i> Nash Equilibria of Sealed-Bid Combinatorial Auctions	<i>Evangelia Chalioti and Konstantinos Serfes</i> Strategic Incentives for Innovations and Market Competition	<i>Chris Wallace and David Myatt</i> Information Use and Acquisition in Price-Setting Oligopolies	<i>Benjamin Sperisen</i> Bounded Memory, Reputation, and Impatience	<i>Mariann Ollar, Marzena Rostek and Ji Hee Yoon</i> Privacy Preserving Market Design	<i>Umut Dur, Ozgur Yilmaz and Arda Gitmez</i> School Choice under Partial Fairness	<i>János Flesch and Arkadi Predtetchinski</i> Subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibria in perfect information games with sigma-discrete discontinuities	<i>Ville Korpela</i> Pure Strategy Nash Implementation with Finite Mechanisms	<i>Yuval Heller and Erik Mohlin</i> Observations on Cooperation
	15:00	<i>Thomas Kittsteiner, Marion Ott and Richard Steinberg</i> Competing Combinatorial Auctions		<i>Jan-Henrik Steg and Jacco Thijssen</i> Quick or Persistent? On the Feedback Effects between First and Second Mover Advantages in a Stochastic Investment Game	<i>Joyee Deb and Yuhta Ishii</i> Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring			<i>János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen and Anna Zseleva</i> A game highlighting the difference between countably and finitely additive strategies	<i>Papatya Duman and Walter Trockel</i> On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game	<i>Takako Fujiwara-Greve and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara</i> Diverse Behavior Patterns in a Symmetric Society with Voluntary Partnerships
16:00-17:00	MORGENSTERN LECTURE	<i>Thomas Palfrey</i> Trading Votes for Votes - A Decentralized Matching Algorithm								
	LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A								
17:15-18:15	ELSEVIER PUBLISHING CONNECT AUTHOR WORKSHOP									
	LOCATION >	A1.23. A								

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // WEDNESDAY 27 JULY 2016

K: LEARNING	L: TOURNAMENTS	M: COMMUNICATION	N: NETWORKS - ATTACK	P: LEGAL	Q: DEPTH OF REASONING	R: SHAPLEY VALUE	S: VOTING	T: FAIR DIVISION	U: EXPERIMENTS - COORDINATION
H0.06 A	A1.22 A	AO.23 A	AO.24 A	EO.04 A	0.012 B	0.011 B	0.010 B	0.009 B	0.008 B
<i>Itai Arieli, Moran Koren and Rann Smorodinsky</i> Bayesian learning in markets with common value	<i>Allen Io Kuan Vong</i> Strategic Manipulation in Tournament Games	<i>Maria Goltsman, Maxim Ivanov and Gregory Pavlov</i> When does simple mediation improve upon cheap talk?	<i>Victor Luna, Ivan Arribas and Amparo Urbano</i> Network performance under attacks	<i>Vatsalya Srivastava</i> The Sorry Clause	<i>Luke Lindsay</i> Adaptive Loss Aversion and Market Experience	<i>Silvia Lorenzo-Freire</i> New characterizations of the Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values using the intracoalitional balanced contributions property	<i>Stefano Vannucci</i> Weakly unimodal domains, antiexchange properties, and coalitional strategy proofness of voting rules	<i>Christian Trudeau</i> From the bankruptcy problem and its Concede-and-Divide solution to the assignment problem and its Fair Division solution	<i>Michael Maes and Heinrich Nax</i> A behavioral study of 'noise' in coordination games
<i>Volodymyr Kuleshov and Okke Schrijvers</i> Inverse Game Theory: Learning Utilities in Succinct Games	<i>Julia Wirtz</i> Feedback and Learning in Tournaments	<i>Shih En Lu</i> Monotonic Cheap Talk	<i>Robert Gilles and Owen Sims</i> The Formation of Extractive Structures in Networks	<i>Hagen Schwerin</i> Swap Bonds or Stocks! A Game of Implicit Environmental Policy	<i>Christian Nauerz, Frauke Meyer and Marion Collewet</i> Sophistication in Strategic One-Shot Interactions: A nonparametric approach for identifying reasoning concepts	<i>Hans Peters and José Zarzuelo</i> An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index	<i>Kirill Pogorelskiy</i> Correlated Equilibria in Voter Turnout Games	<i>Anna Bogomolnaia and Herve Moulin</i> Competitive Fair Division under linear preferences	
<i>Min Zhang</i> Non-Monotone Observational Learning	<i>Timo Hoffmann</i> Performance Pay, Sorting and Employers' Choice: Are Tournaments an Attractive Payment Method?	<i>Andreas Blume</i> Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games		<i>Uri Weiss and Joseph Agassi</i> How Game Theory Encourages Cooperation	<i>Irenaeus Wolff</i> On the salience-based level-k model		<i>Nicola Maaser</i> Simple vs. sophisticated rules for weight allocation in a two-tier voting model	<i>Erel Segal-Halevi and Balázs Sziklai</i> Resource-monotonicity and Population-monotonicity in Cake-cutting	

K: LEARNING	L: TOURNAMENTS	M: PERSUASION	N: ATTACK AND DEFENCE	P: LEGAL	Q: DEPTH OF REASONING	R: SHAPLEY VALUE	S: VOTING, SOCIAL CHOICE		U: EXPERIMENTS
H0.06 A	A1.22 A	AO.23 A	AO.24 A	EO.04 A	0.012 B	0.011 B	0.010 B		0.008 B
<i>Christoph March and Anthony Ziegelmeyer</i> Altruistic Observational Learning	<i>Alex Krumer, Reut Megidish and Aner Sela</i> First-Mover Advantage in Round-Robin Tournaments	<i>Jonas Hedlund</i> Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender	<i>Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson</i> Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto Games	<i>Bharat Goel and Arijit Sen</i> Value Creation vs. Appropriation, and the Evolution of Property Rights	<i>Fabrizio Germano, Jonathan Weinstein and Peio Zuazo-Garin</i> Uncertain Rationality, Depth of Reasoning and Robustness in Games with Incomplete Information	<i>Ayse M. Derya</i> A characterization of the Myerson value	<i>Alexander K. Wagner and Dura-Georg Granic</i> Where Power Resides: Evidence from the Chairman's Paradox		<i>Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Jaume Garcia-Segarra and Alexander Ritschel</i> Performance, Curiosity, and Gender: She Just Wants To Know
<i>Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli and Jiabin Wu</i> The Interplay of Cultural Aversion and Assortativity for the Emergence of Cooperation	<i>Elham Nikram and Dieter Balkenborg</i> Tournament Game with Incumbent	<i>Wolfgang Gick and Thilo Pausch</i> Bayesian Persuasion by Stress Test Disclosure	<i>Yini Gao, Chung-Piaw Teo and Huan Zheng</i> Sequential Attacker-Defender Game with Redeployment: A Conic Approach	<i>Martin Van der Linden</i> Levelling the playing field in jury selection	<i>Adam Brandenburger, Alex Danieli and Amanda Friedenberg</i> How Many Levels Do Players Reason? An Observational Challenge and Solution	<i>Anna Kholmitskaya, Ozer Selcuk and Dolf Talman</i> The Shapley value for directed graph games	<i>Z. Emel Ozturk</i> Alternative characterizations of the plurality rule		<i>Xiaochuan Huang, Takehito Masuda, Yoshitaka Okano and Tatsuyoshi Saijo</i> Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions
		<i>Daehong Min</i> Bayesian Persuasion under Partial Commitment	<i>Christoph Schottmueller and Ole Jann</i> How Jeremy Bentham would defend against coordinated attacks	<i>Luis Miller, Maria Montero and Christoph Vanberg</i> Legislative Bargaining with Heterogeneous Disagreement Values: Theory and Experiments		<i>Federica Briata, Andrea Dall'Aglio, Marco Dall'Aglio and Vito Fragnelli</i> The Shapley Value in the Knaster Gain Game	<i>Xu Lang</i> Characterization of the Minimal Norm Solution with Incomplete Information		<i>Sander Renes and Timo Hoffmann</i> That's impossible: An Experiment on Participation Constraints

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // THURSDAY 28 JULY 2016

09:00-10:30	PARALLEL SESSIONS THU9	A: AUCTIONS - DESIGN	B: IO DYNAMIC	C: IO SCREENING	D: REPUTATION	E: ASSIGNMENT	F: UNIVERSITIES	G: EQUILIBRIUM	H: IMPLEMENTATION	J: EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS
	LOCATION >	C-1.03 A	C-1.05 A	C-1.07 A	C-1.09 A	GO.03 A	G1.01 A	A1.23 A	DO.03 A	HO.04 A
	09:00	<i>Liad Blumrosen and Shahar Dobzinski</i> (Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading	<i>Jan-Henrik Steg</i> Preemptive Investment under Uncertainty	<i>Thomas Daske</i> Pooling hawks and doves: Interim-efficient labor contracts for other-regarding agents.	<i>Daniel Hauser</i> Promoting a Reputation for Quality	<i>Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa</i> Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences	<i>Anna Panova</i> Governance in university	<i>Guillaume Vigerl and Yannick Viossat</i> A characterization of the sets of equilibrium payoffs of finite games	<i>Christian Basteck</i> Scoring Rules and Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies	<i>Diodato Ferraioli and Carmine Ventre</i> Metastability of Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games
	09:30	<i>Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko, Helene Mass and Achim Wambach</i> The imitation game: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement	<i>Shinji Kobayashi and Koji Takenaka</i> Conjectures and Equilibrium in Dynamic Differentiated Duopoly Games	<i>Nemanja Antic and Kai Steverson</i> Screening Through Coordination	<i>Emilia Oljemark</i> Reputation and the value of information in a trust game	<i>Alexei Parakhonyak and Sergey Popov</i> Same Sex Marriage, The Great Equalizer	<i>Mike Peacey and Gervas Huxley</i> How do universities differentiate themselves?	<i>Claudia Meroni and Carlos Pimienta</i> The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games	<i>Mikhail Safronov</i> Efficient Coalition-Proof Full Implementation	<i>Reinoud Joosten and Berend Roorda</i> Meta-stability of attractive evolutionary equilibria
	10:00	<i>Takeharu Sogo</i> Effects of Seller's Information Disclosure in Equity Auctions Requiring Post-Auction Investment	<i>Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyskiel, Marek Bodnar and Fryderyk Mirola</i> Dynamic oligopoly with sticky prices - off-steady-state analysis	<i>Aleksey Tetenov</i> An Economic Theory of Statistical Testing	<i>Emiliano Catonini and Sergey Stepanov</i> Reputation Concerns and Information Aggregation	<i>Francisco Robles Jimenez and Marina Nunez</i> Core and competitive equilibria in one-seller assignment markets with multi-item demands	<i>Julien Combe, Olivier Tercieux and Camille Terrier</i> The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence	<i>Rida Laraki</i> Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Existence of Maximal Elements and Coalitional Equilibria under Discontinuous Preferences		<i>William Sandholm and Mathias Staudigl</i> Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability
11:00-12:30	PARALLEL SESSIONS THU11	A: AUCTIONS - APPLICATIONS	B: IO RESPONSIBILITY		D: REPUTATION	E: ASSIGNMENT	F: MEASURING	G: STRATEGY PROOFNESS	H: IMPLEMENTATION	J: EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS
	LOCATION >	C-1.03 A	C-1.05 A		C-1.09 A	GO.03 A	G1.01 A	A1.23 A	DO.03 A	HO.04 A
	11:00	<i>Francisco Robles</i> An implementation of the Vickrey outcome for buyers-submodular one-seller markets	<i>Tomoya Tajika</i> Concealments of Problems: An Incentive of Avoiding the Responsibility		<i>Ayca Ozdogan</i> Occurrence of deception in the presence of a regulator with reputation concerns	<i>Ata Atay and Marina Nunez</i> Multi-sided assignment games on m-partite graphs	<i>William Zwicker and Josep Freixas</i> Scale-invariant citation indices	<i>Sonal Yadav, Arunava Sen, Souvik Roy and Huaxia Zeng</i> Adjacent non-manipulability and strategy-proofness in voting domains: equivalence results	<i>Tsuyoshi Adachi</i> Strategy-proofness and double implementation with minimax and maximax strategies	<i>Akira Okada and Ryoji Sawa</i> An evolutionary approach to social choice problems with q-quota rules
	11:30	<i>Alexander Heczko</i> Partnership Dissolution, Auctions and Differences between Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept	<i>Lisa Planer-Friedrich and Marco Sahm</i> Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility		<i>Umberto Grandi and Paolo Turrini</i> A network-based rating system and its resistance to bribery	<i>Johannes Hofbauer</i> d-dimensional Stable Matching with Cyclic Preferences	<i>Karol Szwagrzak and Rafael Treibich</i> Co-authorship and the Measurement of Individual Productivity	<i>Matuš Mihalák, Paolo Penna and Peter Widmayer</i> Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains	<i>Peter Eccles and Nora Wegner</i> Robustness of Subgame Perfect Implementation	<i>Matjaz Steinbacher and Mitja Steinbacher</i> Opinion Formation with Imperfect Agents as an Evolutionary Process
	12:00	<i>Nozomu Muto, Yasuhiro Shirata and Takuro Yamashita</i> Revenue-capped efficient auctions	<i>Stefan Napel and Dominik Welter</i> Responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages			<i>David Ong, Yu Yang and Junsen Zhang</i> Hard to get: The scarcity of women and the competition for high-income men in Chinese cities	<i>Andy Zapechelnyuk</i> How to score multiple-choice tests: an axiomatic approach			<i>Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli</i> The Evolution of Conventions under Condition-Dependent Mistakes
13:00-14:00	SHAPLEY LECTURE	<i>Bruno Ziliotto</i> Limit Value in Stochastic Games								
	LOCATION >	Lecture Hall A								

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // THURSDAY 28 JULY 2016

K: EXPERIMENTATION	L: CONTESTS	M: COMMUNICATION	N: CONGESTION GAMES	P: DETERRENCE	Q: EQUILIBRUM COMPUTATION	R: SHAPLEY VALUE	S: POLITICAL ECONOMY	T: SOCIAL CHOICE	U: EXPERIMENTS
HO.06 ^A	A1.22 ^A	AO.23 ^A	AO.24 ^A	EO.04 ^A	O.012 ^B	O.011 ^B	O.010 ^B	O.009 ^B	O.008 ^B
<i>Christoph Wolf</i> Informative Milestones in Experimentation	<i>Xiaoyu Cheng, Jie Zheng and Jaimie Lien</i> A Fairness Condition for Unfair Contests: Multi-Dimensional Favoritism with Asymmetric Players	<i>Anton Kolotilin and Hongyi Li</i> Relational Communication with Transfers	<i>Ivan Arribas and Amparo Urbano</i> Local coordination and global congestion in random networks	<i>Elham Nikram and Dieter Balkenborg</i> Inspection Game with Partial Inspections	<i>Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman and Vincent Conitzer</i> Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners)	<i>Xun-Feng Hu and Deng-Feng Li</i> On the relationship between Shapley and configuration values	<i>Yiming Liu</i> Income Inequality and Political Polarization	<i>Christopher Chambers and Alan Miller</i> Benchmarking	<i>Florian Engl</i> Causal Responsibility in Games
<i>Matthew Embrey, Friederike Mengel and Ronald Peeters</i> Strategy Revision Opportunities and Collusion	<i>Charlène Cosandier</i> Intermediaries versus Trolls in Contests for Patents	<i>Simon Schopohl</i> Communication Games with Optional Verification	<i>Philip Brown and Jason Marden</i> Optimal Mechanisms for Robust Coordination in Congestion Games	<i>Artyom Jelnov</i> Proportional use of force in counter-terrorism	<i>Kimmo Berg and Tuomas Sandholm</i> Exclusion Method for Finding Nash Equilibrium in Multi-Player Games	<i>Ben Mcquillin and Robert Sugden</i> Backward induction foundations of the Shapley value	<i>Joseph McMurray</i> Polarization and Pandering in a Spatial Model of Common-Value Elections	<i>Benny Moldovanu and Andreas Kleiner</i> Sophisticated sincerity with incomplete information	<i>Paul Healy, Ritesh Jain and Ryan Oprea</i> An Experimental Test of Belief Free Strategies in a Repeated Game with Stochastic Private Monitoring
		<i>Shintaro Miura</i> Equilibrium Selection in Persuasion Games with Binary Actions				<i>André Casajus and Frank Huettner</i> Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value	<i>Charles Zheng</i> The Optimal Degree of Centralization	<i>Tilman Borgers and Yan Min Choo</i> Revealed Relative Utilitarianism	<i>Alexander Coutts</i> Good News and Bad News are Still News: Experimental Evidence on Belief Updating
K: LEARNING	L: PRISONER'S DILEMMA	M: PERSUASION	N: CONGESTION GAMES	P: PROSPECT THEORY	Q: EQUILIBRIUM, COMPUTATION	R: SPORTS	S: POLITICAL ECONOMY	T: SOCIAL CHOICE	U: EXPERIMENTS - VOTING
HO.06 ^A	A1.22 ^A	AO.23 ^A	AO.24 ^A	EO.04 ^A	O.012 ^B	O.011 ^B	O.010 ^B	O.009 ^B	O.008 ^B
<i>Katharina Schüller and Frank Thuijsman</i> The Advantage of Sex and Selfish Alleles	<i>Bin Xu, Yanran Zhou, Jaimie Lien, Jie Zheng and Zhijian Wang</i> Extortion can outperform generosity in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma	<i>Ronen Gradwohl and Timothy Feddersen</i> Persuasion and Transparency	<i>Tobias Harks, Marc Schröder and Dries Vermeulen</i> Optimal price caps in congested networks	<i>Florian Herold and Nick Netzer</i> Second-best Probability Weighting	<i>Youcef Askoura and Antoine Billot</i> Utilitarian Nash Equilibrium for Games with Incomplete Preferences	<i>Sam Ganzfried</i> Reflections on the First Man vs. Machine No-Limit Texas Hold 'em Competition	<i>Mario Gilli and Li Yuan</i> Reciprocal Accountability with Multidimensional Policies	<i>Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters</i> Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization	<i>Aaron Kamm</i> Plurality Voting versus Proportional Representation in the Citizen-Candidate Model: An Experiment
<i>Omer Edhan, Ziv Hellman and Dana Sherill-Rofe</i> Sex With No Regrets: How Sexual Reproduction Uses a No Regret Learning Algorithm for Evolutionary Advantage	<i>Hitoshi Matsushima, Yutaka Kayaba and Tomohisa Toyama</i> Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory	<i>Jacopo Bizzotto, Jesper Rüdiger and Adrien Vigier</i> The Optimal Timing of Persuasion	<i>Jasper de Jong, Bart De Keijzer, Marc Uetz and Jose Correa</i> The curse of sequentiality in routing games	<i>Marcus Pivato and Vassili Vergopoulos</i> Subjective expected utility representations for Savage preferences on topological spaces	<i>Noam Brown and Tuomas Sandholm</i> Simultaneous Abstraction and Equilibrium Finding in Games	<i>Steven Brams and Mehmet Ismail</i> Making the Rules of Sports Fairer	<i>Hans Gersbach and Oriol Tejada</i> A Reform Dilemma in Polarized Democracies	<i>Onur Dogan and Jean Lainé</i> Strategic Manipulation of Social Welfare Functions via Strict Preference Extensions	<i>Yukio Koriyama and Ali Ihsan Ozkes</i> Condorcet Jury Theorem and Cognitive Hierarchies: Theory and Experiments
<i>Jason Hartford, James Wright and Kevin Leyton-Brown</i> Deep Learning for Human Strategic Modeling				<i>Lars Metzger and Marc Rieger</i> Non-cooperative games with prospect theory players and dominated strategies	<i>Yin Chen and Chuangyin Dang</i> A Smooth Path-Following Method for Determining Perfect Equilibria		<i>Jacopo Perego and Sevgi Yuksel</i> Media Competition and the Source of Disagreement		<i>Miguel Costa-Gomes, Yuan Ju and Jiawen Li</i> Expected-Norm Consistency: An Experimental Study of Trust and Trustworthiness

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